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The study of migration is characterized by a multidisciplinary approach. Violence, poverty, and 
climate change are often analyzed as separate drivers of migration, with some research analyzing 
these factors in pairs. There is, however, a gap in the literature discussing migration in a multi-
variable way. Anna Tsing’s model of entanglement offers a more nuanced approach. Focusing 
on places where drivers influence each other broadens the lens in which we view migration, and 
better reflects the actual reasons behind it. We can see this in analyzing migration in the 
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The study of migration is characterized by a multidisciplinary approach, frequently executed 
using the framework of a push-pull model. 1 This push-pull model posits that certain factors 
“push” people out of their place of origin at the same time as other factors “pull” them toward a 
different location.2 For example, poor economic conditions in Central America push people out, 
while the economic prospects in the United States pull people in. These approaches frequently 
analyze drivers of migration singularly and only occasionally in pairs.3 However, much of the 
literature ignores the ways that various drivers of migration intertwine to form complicated and 
nuanced pushes for migration.4 Using Anna Tsing’s illustration of the complex, interconnected 
world of matsutake mushrooms – explored in her examination of forest management practices, 
the economics of international markets, US race relations, and the biology of forests – I argue 
that the connections between individual drivers of migration should be analyzed with an 
emphasis on the ways in which they feed into each other and become entangled. Understanding 
these entanglements is significant in tackling the issues driving migration, as well as 
understanding how they evolve as newer drivers of migration, like climate change, emerge. 
The International Organization of Migration (IOM) defines climate migration as: 
The movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of 
sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to 
leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or 
permanently, within a State or across an international border.5 
 
 
1 Castles, Stephen. “International Migration at a Crossroads.” Citizenship Studies 18, no. 2 (February 17, 2014): 
190–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2014.886439. 
2 Castles 2014 
3 Haas, Hein de. “The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry.” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 36, no. 10 (December 1, 2010): 1587–1617. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489361. 
4 Morales-Muñoz, Héctor, Srijna Jha, Michelle Bonatti, Henryk Alff, Sabine Kurtenbach, and Stefan Sieber. 
“Exploring Connections—Environmental Change, Food Security and Violence as Drivers of Migration—A Critical 
Review of Research.” Sustainability 12, no. 14 (January 2020): 5702. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12145702. 




This definition implies migration driven by a primary driver, yet by following this reason we get 
to the center of entanglements. First, we will examine the literature covering the distinct, 
separate drivers of climate change, violence, and poverty in the Northern Triangle. We will also 
examine how these drivers are discussed in pairs. Then, we will discuss the methodology used in 
The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins by Anna 
Tsing, which discusses the concept of entanglement to explore the complicated nature of the 
movement, marketing, and biology of the matsutake mushroom, and how that can be extended to 
the ways drivers of migration entangle. Finally, we will explore the case study of the Maya 





Climate and Migration in the Northern Triangle 
 The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has cited climate change as 
potentially having the single greatest impact on migration as early as 1990.6 In Central America, 
major weather events such as hurricanes and drought are only further exacerbated by climate 
change and are causing people to migrate today.7 The Northern Triangle is particularly 
vulnerable because of its high reliability on agricultural production and poor economic position 
globally.8 Hurricane Eta and Hurricane Iota, hurricanes that occurred back-to-back in the 2020 
Atlantic hurricane season, are two examples. Both hurricanes came within the context of a 
particularly active hurricane season, which scientists link to an increase in global temperature.9 
Hurricane Eta, the third strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic hurricane season, 
ultimately killed 74 Hondurans, 53 Guatemalans, and one Salvadoran. Heavy flooding, 
landslides, and strong winds destroyed 457 homes and cut off 41 communities in Honduras, 
which was hit the hardest by Eta.10 In Guatemala, landslides destroyed over 200 homes, with 96 
people still missing as a result.11 Two weeks later, Hurricane Iota, the second strongest hurricane 
ever recorded in the Atlantic hurricane season, made landfall. Iota hit several countries in Central 
America, but in the Northern Triangle specifically, Honduras was primarily affected. The 
hurricane exacerbated the damage just caused by Hurricane Eta, raising the death toll by 16 
 
6 Brown, Oli “IPCC — Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Sixth Assessment Report.” 2020. Accessed 
January 12, 2021. https://www.ipcc.ch/. 
7 Brown 2020 
8 Brown 2020 
9 Brown 2020 
10 Tisch, Chris. “At Least 13 Dead in Central America from Eta as Forecasters Watch Florida Impact.” The Tampa 
Bay Times, November 5, 2020. https://www.tampabay.com/hurricane/2020/11/05/at-least-13-dead-in-central-
america-from-eta-as-forecasters-watch-florida-impact/.  
11 Castañeda, José Miguel. “Giammattei: ‘Eta Dejó Pérdidas Por Más De Q3 Mil Millones.’” Soy502, November 16, 
2020. https://www.soy502.com/articulo/giammattei-eta-dejo-perdidas-mas-q3-mil-millones-63338 .  
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people in Honduras.12 According to the Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (Permanent 
Contingency Commission, or COPECO), a Honduran government entity made to coordinate 
disaster relief efforts, approximately 366,123 people were affected by the hurricane.13 
The consequences of such severe hurricanes, driven by a warming climate, reach beyond 
the immediate death toll. The consequences of Hurricane Mitch, the second-deadliest Atlantic 
hurricane on record, are still felt today. The 1998 hurricane most heavily impacted Honduras, 
killing approximately 7,000 people.14 Landslides and flooding ensured the hurricane was felt 
long after it left, causing approximately 3.8 billion dollars in damage, or approximately 70 
percent of Honduras’ annual GPD.15 Over 20 years later, Honduras is still recovering from 
Hurricane Mitch. Hurricane Mitch was also responsible for a massive increase in both internal 
and external displacement. In the aftermath, approximately 70 percent of the population was cut 
off from fresh water sources, and 70 percent of crops were destroyed.16 1.5 million people, or 20 
percent of the population, were left homeless.17 Many of these displaced people moved towards 
the United States, with a significant uptick in apprehensions of Hondurans on the Mexico-
Guatemala border shortly after the hurricane.18 In response, the United States extended 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Hondurans, which is set to expire in October of 2021.19 
 
12 Trigueros, Ariel. “A La Fecha Se Registran 16 Hondureños Muertos Tras Paso De Iota.” La Prensa, November 
19, 2020. https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1423481-410/reporte-muertos-honduras-paso-iota-derrumbes-
deslizamientos-inundaciones.  
13 Trigueros 2020 
14“DAT: The International Disasters Database.” EM. Accessed April 16, 2021. https://www.emdat.be/.   
15 The Inter-American Development Bank. “Central America After Hurricane Mitch The Challenge of Turning a 
Disaster into an Opportunity.” Central America After Hurricane Mitch - Honduras, 2000. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20051219114814/http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/backgrounder2.h
tm.   
16 The Inter-American Development Bank 2020 
17 The Inter-American Development Bank 2020 
18 “Hurricane Mitch - Migration News: Migration Dialogue.” Hurricane Mitch - Migration News | Migration 
Dialogue, February 1, 1999. https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1721_0_2_0. 
19 Obinna, Denise N. "Transiciones e Incertidumbres: Migration from El Salvador, Honduras and 




The severity of Eta and Iota pushed the government of Honduras to ask the United States to 
further extend TPS.20 The frequency and unusual strength of these hurricanes are no longer rare 
occurrences, and the subsequent devastation to homes and crop land, not to mention the loss of 
thousands of lives, is only predicted to get worse as the climate continues to warm.21  
Global warming hasn’t just increased the severity and frequency of hurricanes. Climate 
change-exacerbated drought is also becoming a pressing issue. Central America generally 
experiences long seasons of drought that are made worse by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) climate pattern. The ENSO is characterized by two phases: as winds shift and the sea 
warms, the tropics experience a period of dry, warm weather, called El Niño, that ends when La 
Niña, the second phase of the ENSO, brings a period of cool, wet weather.22 The changes in the 
frequency and severity of the phases of the ENSO cycle are difficult to predict as the climate 
continues to warm. However, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association 
(NOAA), under more aggressive greenhouse gas emissions scenarios, the frequency of ENSO 
shifts as well as the severity of weather events caused by the ENSO will only get worse. Like 
hurricanes, the frequency and severity of drought in the Northern Triangle is made worse by 
climate change. According to a UN backed study published in 2017, there is a correlation 
between the number of migrants coming from the Northern Triangle and increased severity and 




20 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of 
Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal.” Federal 
Register, December 9, 2020. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/09/2020-27154/continuation-of-
documentation-for-beneficiaries-of-temporary-protected-status-designations-for-el.  
21 Brown 2020 
22 The National Drought Mitigation Center. “ENSO and Drought Forecasting.” National Drought Mitigation Center. 
Accessed April 16, 2021. https://drought.unl.edu/Education/DroughtIn-depth/ENSO.aspx.  
23 The World Food Programme (WFP), The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), The International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), The Organization of American States (OAS), and The International Organization 
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drought is the location of the Dry Corridor, a dry, forested area that spans the length of Central 
America and is especially vulnerable to drought. Approximately 62% of households in the 
Northern Triangle live in the Dry Corridor. 
Starting in 2009 with more severe periods in 2014 and 2018, prolonged drought still 
continues to affect the region today and push migration. The severity and length of these 
droughts is directly connected to climate change.24 The climate change-exacerbated El Niño 
cycle during this period is also a significant contributing factor to these events; the consequences 
of this now decade-long period of drought are extensive and critical. 50 to 90 percent of crops in 
the Northern Triangle were wiped out between 2006 and 2016, according to the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO).25 Between 2010 and 2015, the time period associated with the 
onset of the prolonged drought, migration from the region increased by 500 percent.26 Without 
the infrastructure to aid farmers who had little else to support themselves, these back-to-back 
droughts have destroyed the livelihood of many families who rely on subsistence farming to live.  
These droughts also began to bring climate to the front of migrants’ reasoning for 
moving. After the 2014 and 2018 droughts, Honduran farmers migrating to the United States 
began to actively acknowledge climate change as the reason for their migration.27 Whereas in 
previous years climate change was not necessarily the reason for migrating, the increased 
 
for Migration (IOM). “FOOD SECURITY AND EMIGRATION Why People Flee and the Impact on Family 
Members Left behind in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras .” The United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals, 2017. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/08/emigration-and-food-insecurity-in-central-
american-dry-corridor-focus-of-new-un-backed-study/.   
24 The World Food Program (WFP) et al, 2017 
25 F.A.O. In: Diaz T, Burgeon D, editors. Dry Corridor in Central America: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations; 2016. 
26 Balsari, S., Dresser, C. & Leaning, J. Climate Change, Migration, and Civil Strife. Curr Envir Health Rpt 7, 404–
414 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40572-020-00291-4  
27 Semple, Kirk. “Central American Farmers Head to the U.S., Fleeing Climate Change.” The New York Times. The 




severity and frequency of weather events like hurricanes and periods of drought, which are 
caused by climate change, are beginning to be noticed by those forced to migrate. Migration is 
only predicted to increase as climate change worsens. Although various organizations offer 
different projections of migration caused by climate change, their numbers tend to vary by 
millions of people. For example, the World Bank Group estimates between 1.4 and 2.1 million 
climate migrants will come from Central America and Mexico by 2050.28  
According to one study conducted by Morales-Muñoz et al. concerning the amount of 
literature on the ways violent conflict, environmental change, and food security intertwine to 
drive migration globally, there is in general a severe lack of focus on environmental change in 
conjunction with multiple other drivers of migration. They found 58 publications discussing the 
environment alone or the environment in conjunction with one other driver of migration. In 
contrast, they only found five publications that discussed all three drivers together.29 This only 
begins to shed light on the gap in the literature, as their study only covers these three variables. 
The literature that does explore climate change in conjunction with one other variable often does 
it in a fairly unidirectional way, with little room to explore the multiple connections between 
climate change and other drivers of migration.30 In “Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate  
Change of Rural Inhabitants in the Central Coastal Plain of El Salvador” by Martha Aguilar et 
al., researchers calculated the Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CVI) of people living in the 
 
28 Rigaud, Kumari K., Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Jonas Bergmann, Viviane Clement, Kayly Ober, Jacob 
Schewe, Susana Adamo, Brent McCusker, Silke Heuser, and Amelia Midgley. “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal 
Climate Migration.” World Bank f(2018). 
29 Morales-Muñoz et al. 2020 
30 Harvey, Celia A., Milagro Saborio-Rodríguez, M. Ruth Martinez-Rodríguez, Barbara Viguera, Adina Chain-
Guadarrama, Raffaele Vignola, and Francisco Alpizar. “Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation among 




central coastal plain of El Salvador. They use socio-cultural factors, economic factors, and the 
threat level of current and predicted environmental degradation to determine how vulnerable a 
certain population is to climate change. In their research, though, there is little room left for 
complexity. The factors they lay out are examined with the assumption of a linear connection. 
Although they put forward subfactors under each of the three relevant categories, these 
subfactors are isolated from each other in their analysis. There is not any entanglement, and the 
complex ways that they feed into and take away from each other are left out of the discussion. 
Climate change vulnerability, in this example, is a result of variables that act in distinct, singular 
ways.31  
The analysis of climate change as a singular driver of migration ignores the context in 
which climate change operates. It places emphasis on a causal event (a prolonged drought, for 
example) and the subsequent effect (the increased movement of peoples, for example). While 
this is important, it leaves gaps in the reasoning of people migrating after these events. What else 
was happening when this drought hit? How are individuals accidentally, or purposefully, 
contributing to climate change by simply trying to survive? What else exacerbates their drive to 
migrate, but also how do these factors contribute to their ability to migrate? In typical analysis, 
there is little attention paid to the multifaceted context of a particular situation. Looking at these 
factors in an entangled way, rather than a simple chain reaction between climate change and 
farmers’ ability to cope, allows the intertwining of multiple factors and provides a better picture 
of why people are migrating. 
 
 
31 Nelson, Andrew and Kenneth M. Chomitz. “The Forest-Hydrology-Poverty Nexus in Central America: An 





Violence and Migration in the Northern Triangle 
The study of migration in the Northern Triangle often sits in the context of violence. This 
violence stems from several sources: the police or military, paramilitary groups, current or past 
political conflict, or gangs and cartels.32 All of these actors work – at times in conjunction with 
each other, like in the case of street gangs and cartels – to perpetuate violence in the region. 
Hiskey et al. establishes that violence is the predominant driver of migration from Honduras and 
El Salvador, and that it has a significant impact on the reasoning behind Guatemalan migrants’ 
movement. Homicide, high levels of rape, assault, and other forms of violence make the 
Northern Triangle one of the most statistically violent regions in the world.33 According the most 
recent available data from the World Bank (2018), El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are in 
the top 20 most violent countries globally based on homicide rate alone. El Salvador, ranked first 
globally, had a homicide rate of 52 per 100,000 people; Honduras, ranked fifth globally, had a 
homicide rate of 39 per 100,000 people; and Guatemala, ranked 19th globally, had a homicide 
rate of 23 per 100,000 people.34 Violence has remained high since then. According to Insight 
Crime, in 2019 El Salvador’s homicide rate was 36 per 100,000 people, with a total of 2,390 
homicides; Honduras’ was 41.2 per 100,000 people, with a total of 3,996 deaths; and 
Guatemala’s was 21.5 per 100,000 people, with a total of 3,578 murders.35 The consequences of 
 
32 Hiskey, Jonathan T., Abby Córdova, Mary Fran Malone, and Diana M. Orcés. “Leaving the Devil You Know: 
Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America.” Latin American 
Research Review 53, no. 3 (2018): 429–47. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.25222/larr.147. 
33 World Bank “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People).” Data, 2018. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=map.  
34 World Bank, 2018 
35 Asmann, Parker, and Eimhin O'Reilly. “InSight Crime's 2019 Homicide Round-Up.” InSight Crime, February 2, 
2021. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/insight-crime-2019-homicide-round-up/.  
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the global shutdown due to COVID have significantly decreased homicide rates in 2020, 
although they still remained some of the highest both regionally and globally.36  
Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle collectively point toward a larger picture of 
violence, set within multiple variables. One of these variables is the sustained high levels of post-
war violence. El Salvador and Guatemala both experienced prolonged periods of political 
violence during two civil wars that began in 1979 and 1960 respectively.37 Guatemala’s conflict 
was predominantly based on issues of land distribution, which was significantly skewed in favor 
of white, wealthy Guatemalans descendent from Spaniards. This conflict significantly 
strengthened the capacities of the Guatemalan government to commit violence because of the 
development of specialized military death squads and the empowerment of state security forces 
to commit extreme acts of violence through increased funding and little oversight.38 This was 
possible in part because of the millions of dollars the United States funneled to Guatemala to fuel 
their anti-communist agenda and combat leftist groups.39 Thousands were disappeared, several 
remote villages were massacred, and the Guatemalan government, through military and police, 
repeatedly violated the rights of seemingly any citizen who stood against them. At the same time, 
several of these leftist groups formed their own paramilitaries, fighting back against these 
massacres and human rights violations. After a decade of tenuous peace talks, the Guatemalan 
Civil War officially ended in 1996, although notably this did not mean an end to the high levels 
of violence that characterize a state in perpetual political conflict.40 
 
36 Asmann, Parker, and Katie Jones. “InSight Crime's 2020 Homicide Round-Up.” InSight Crime, March 25, 2021. 
https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2020-homicide-round-up/.  
37 Yuichi Kubota. "Explaining State Violence in the Guatemalan Civil War: Rebel Threat and 
Counterinsurgency." Latin American Politics and Society 59, no. 3 (2017): 48-71. 
38 Amelia Hoover Green. "Armed Group Institutions and Combatant Socialization." Journal of Peace Research 54, 
no. 5 (2017): 687-700. 
39 Kubota 2017 
40 Kubtoa 2017 
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El Salvador’s civil war was also bloody, albeit shorter than Guatemala’s, and was also 
based on issues surrounding land reform. Several attempts at land redistribution were thwarted 
by the military, Salvadoran elite, and the United States, which actively supported any anti-leftist 
groups in the Northern Triangle. The Furibund Martí National Liberation Front (hereafter 
FMLN), a leftist group that sought land reform in order to create better economic equality, 
fought against the increasingly violent Salvadoran government. Like in Guatemala, death squads 
and other specially trained military groups, trained in part using American tactics and funded by 
American money, enacted mass disappearances, massacres, and committed a multitude of other 
human rights violations. As a result of the civil war, corruption of the police and military in El 
Salvador, like in Guatemala, became a much larger issue, being more empowered than ever 
before to commits acts of violence with impunity. This has continued to be a problem long after 
the end of the war, with peace accords being signed in 1992. Like the Guatemalan peace accords, 
the official end to the political conflict did not mean an end to the high levels of violence in the 
region.41  
Although both civil wars ended in the 1990s, their affects are still felt today. 
Displacement as a consequence of these wars was massive. A fifth of El Salvador’s population 
fled, and many people (both refugees and combatants) spilled over into neighboring Honduras to 
escape violence in Guatemala and El Salvador, sometimes inadvertently bringing violence with 
them.42 Many view the peace talks that officially ended the conflicts as performative and 
ineffective.43 There are several reasons for the ineffectiveness of these prolonged peace talks in 
 
41 Green 2017 
42 Susan D. Burgerman. "Building the Peace by Mandating Reform: United Nations-Mediated Human Rights 
Agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala." Latin American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2000): 63-87. 
43 Méndez, María José. “The Violence Work of Transnational Gangs in Central America.” Third World Quarterly 




terms of decreasing violence in the Northern Triangle. One significant factor is the continued 
empowerment of government security forces to commit acts of violence.44 During both civil 
wars, the focus on training the military to perform extreme acts of violence beyond combat 
combined with American cash flow created a lasting effect on the power of the military, which 
already held significant political power previous to the civil wars.45 Although there have been 
some attempts at decreasing the power of militaries in the Northern Triangle during period of 
liberal government, these attempts have done little to curb the prolific corruption, sustained 
political and social power, lack of community trust, and general continuity of abuses.46  
Those who left groups that perpetuated conflict during the civil wars, both former rebels 
and former military, are also some of the violent actors contributing to emigration. In “The 
Violence Work of Transnational Gangs in Central America,” Maria José Méndez discusses how 
the lack of integration for former rebels and ex-military, including those belonging to special 
forces groups trained in extreme forms of violence, created thousands of people with no other 
way to generate income other than to participate in what she calls “violence work.”47 “Violence 
work” is the use of violence as an economic necessity and those who participate hire themselves 
out as violent actors in order to cope in the precarious economies of the Northern Triangle. 
Méndez  discusses this in the context of the gangs and cartels of the region. There is a market for 
both small-scale violence, or violence committed between community members, and larger-
scaled violence, like violence perpetuated in the name of a transnational organized crime group. 
Former combatants, especially those trained in specific forms of torture or murder, are highly 
 
44 Pérez, Orlando J. Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies. Routledge Studies in Latin American 
Politics. London: Routledge, 2015. 
45 Pérez 2015 
46 “Confronting Violence in Post-War Guatemala: An Introduction” by Timothy Smith and Thomas Offit 
47 Méndez 2019 
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valued by cartels to commit acts of communicative violence. On a smaller scale, gang members 
participate in both. Larger, more infamous gangs, like MS-13, in addition to participating in 
violence as a way to show membership, are also hired by cartels to perpetuate communicative 
violence.48  
Gangs in the Northern Triangle began to stream in during the late 1980s, coincidentally 
during the idle of both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran civil wars. The most prolific and 
infamous gangs in the Northern Triangle, MS-13 and Calle 18, originally formed in the United 
States between Mexican and Salvadoran immigrant communities. During the 1980s, and 
especially in the 1990s, the US began deporting members of both gangs back to their home 
countries. Like in the empowerment of the military and police in the Northern Triangle, and in 
the creation and deportation of gangs into already vulnerable areas, the United States was also a 
significant part in the presence of cartels in the region. The issue of cartels began to grow in 
force around the year 2000, after US efforts to exterminate groups trafficking through the 
Caribbean instead pushed these groups to traffic through Central America.49 Violence associated 
with cartels is highest in areas where they launder money, which primarily occurs in Guatemala 
and Honduras.50 Violent coercion, in part done by hiring gang members, is also used to acquire 
land in order to participate in other lucrative illicit activities like illegal deforestation and coerce 
communities into compliance. The War on Drugs also facilitated an influx of arms into the 
Northern Triangle (and into Latin America at large) further exacerbating violence in the region.51 
 
48 "Montreal MP Probes the Sub-Culture of Gangs in Canada - Americas Quarterly". Americas Quarterly. November 
12, 2009. Retrieved September 30, 2020. 
49 Americas Quarterly 2009 
50 Hiskey et al. 2018 
51 Landa-Blanco, Miguel, Cheon, Hyunjung, Reyes Flores, Luis Gerardo, Spohn, Cassia, and Katz, Charles Max. 
"Violence in Honduras from 2008 to 2018." Injury Prevention 26, no. 2 (2020): 191-93. 
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Gangs are the second factor in the make-up of violence in the Northern Triangle. At 
times, gang members will work in tandem with cartels to commit acts of violence or to 
participate in illegal trafficking. However, unlike cartels, whose primary objective is to make 
money through illicit trafficking, gangs’ primary source of income is through violence.52 Gangs 
and cartels, and the political and military machines in the Northern Triangle that perpetuate 
violence are all, in part, driven by US intervention. Without US intervention, the severity of 
conflict, as well as the presence of gangs and cartels, may not have ever been as significant an 
issue as it is today.  Although this paper is not meant to focus on the history of neocolonial 
American intervention in Latin America, and especially in the Northern Triangle, it is important 
to note the significant American contributions to exacerbating conflict in the region. 
Although this research is not focused specifically on the role of the United States in driving 
migration in, it is important to note the connections that American interference has to violence 
and economic precariousness in the region 
In “The Violence of Citizenship in the Making of Refugees”, María Josefina Saldaña-
Portillo makes the connections between foreign political interference and the creation of violence 
as a driver of migration, with the United States contributing millions of dollars to interfering in 
Central American governments during the 20th century.53 Not only did the US fund violence in 
the region, but it also directly contributed to the severity and type of violence found there. 
Specialized Central American military groups, who committed particularly horrific violence 
during the Guatemalan and Salvadoran civil wars, were often trained by American security 
 
52 Méndez 2019 
53 Greenwald, Glenn. “The CIA's Murderous Practices, Disinformation Campaigns, and Interference in Other 





forces. The United States’ interference in Central America (broadly in the name of the War on 
Drugs) not only pushed tons of arms into the region, but it also provided police with military 
training in the name of cracking down on organized crime. Instead of stopping cartels, however, 
this only made the police more akin to an active military force than local mitigators of conflict. 
As a result, police violence in the region is a large contributor to the issue of violence as a 
whole.54 As Saldaña-Portillo points to, this also means that migration from the Northern Triangle 
coming to the United States is, in part, the fault of the US. 
The literature on violence driving migration considers post-war violence from 
unintegrated combatants, violence stemming from organized crime, and violence coming from 
the state security forces, or more “official” sources. As violence is an often-cited factor in what 
drives migrants from the Northern Triangle, the literature on violence as a driver of migration is 
fairly focused on violence as it exists alone. Although there exists a broad range of literature 
covering the sources of violence in the Northern Triangle, as discussed in this section, the 
analysis occurs within a vacuum. The statistics Morales-Muñoz et al. gathered discussing the 
amount of environmental change studies are very similar to those found on studies covering 
violent conflict in conjunction with other drivers of migration. They found 51 studies discussing 
violence on its own or violence in conjunction with one other driver. In contrast, only five 
studies were found that discussed all three factors in their study together.55 Violence exacerbates 
and is exacerbated by multiple factors, in addition to and beyond these three. By reaching 
beyond violence, and integrating both economic issues and climate change, a more complex and 
nuanced picture begins to emerge. 
 
54 Clavel, Tristan. “Militarization and Crime: Central America's Dangerous Gamble.” InSight Crime, November 21, 
2017. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/militarization-and-crime-central-americas-dangerous-gamble/.  




Poverty and Migration in the Northern Triangle 
Economic vulnerability is another major driver of migration – it is commonly cited that 
most migrants are economic migrants.56 The Northern Triangle specifically is no stranger to 
economic inequality. Although the GDPS of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been 
on the rise in the past two years, according to the World Bank, poverty is still high in each 
country due to severe wealth disparity. Poverty is a multidimensional issue, and in the Northern 
Triangle, it is characterized by food insecurity and debt. While the economies of all three 
countries in the Northern Triangle are steadily growing, a significant percentage of each 
population is still living in poverty. This disparity, itself exacerbated by a rural-urban divide, 
exacerbates poverty. Honduras’ GDP, for example, has grown by at least 2 percent every year 
since 2017.57 But, according to the World Bank, poverty in Honduras continues to be extremely 
high at 48.3 percent.58 Guatemala’s GDP has grown at 3.5 percent for the past five years, yet 
poverty still remains high.59 El Salvador is the only country in the Northern Triangle that has 
made strides towards equal wealth distribution, although their GDP growth has stalled recently, 
averaging about 2.3 percent in the past three years, and poverty, again, still remains an issue.60 
The consequences of this continued poverty drive migration from the Northern Triangle. 
Although not the sole indicator of poverty, food insecurity is a significant and pervasive 
problem in the region. In Guatemala, for example, only 40 percent of households have secure 
 
56 Van Lange, Paul A. M. van, Maria I. Rinderu, and Brad J. Bushman. “CLASH: Climate (Change) and Cultural 
Evolution of Intergroup Conflict.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 21, no. 3 (April 2018): 457–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430217735579. 
57 Honduras Overview.” World Bank. 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/honduras/overview.  
58 World Bank “Honduras Overview” 2018 
59 “Guatemala Overview” World Bank. 2018 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview 
60 El Salvador Overview” World Bank  2018 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador/overview 
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access to food.61 In one study published in 2017 by the World Food Program (WFP), results 
revealed that households interviewed in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador spent about two-
thirds of their income on food. Migration away from the Northern Triangle further exacerbates 
the issue by cutting down on the available workforce. If not offset by remittances from family 
members who have already migrated, migration can significantly impact food security. Small-
holder farms in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, with both their incomes and their access 
to food beholden to a competitive global market, are especially vulnerable.62 The selling and 
accumulation of the land of subsistence farmers by larger plantations or cartels also increases 
food insecurity in a given area.63 People are not guaranteed to benefit from the large amount of 
money cartel activity attracts, and most do not, which further exacerbates food insecurity in areas 
with strong criminal presence. 64  These factors exacerbate food insecurity and reinforce poverty, 
as those who rely on their land are now unable to reliably grow food to eat or to sell.  
Debt is another aspect of poverty that drives migration in the Northern Triangle, 
especially for those who make repeated attempts to migrate. In “The Coercive Power of Debt: 
Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth,” Lauren Heidbrink interviews 
young indigenous Guatemalans who were forced into attempting to migrate over and over again 
in order to pay off their debt, often chosen by their families because of their status as young, 
able-bodied men. Expected to adjust quicker and get better work in the United States, the 
repeated deportations of these youths has created a cycle of money owed to coyotes and other 
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groups who loan money to migrants. Starting from a place of poverty, their migration has 
ultimately only exacerbated their economic position.65 
The literature on poverty in the Northern Triangle connects it to historical and current 
trends in the region’s relationship to the rest of the world. For example, like violence, the United 
States also contributes to the economic precariousness driving migration from Central America. 
In “Migration as Resistance to Global Capitalism: From Cause to Action in the Migration of 
Central American Children to the United States,” Edwin Lopez argues that globalization drove 
the surge of minors seeking entrance into the United States in 2014. He discusses how, in 
response to increasingly dire economic disenfranchisement in their home countries, minors 
migrated towards the United States in the summer of 2014 seeking relief. The proliferation of 
international corporations, as well as a history of failed US-backed neoliberal economic reform 
across the Western Hemisphere, contributes to the persistence of wealth inequality and high 
levels of poverty in the region.66 
The Northern Triangle is also, in multiple ways, reliant on the United States for continued 
capital flow. As previously discussed, many people rely on remittances from their family 
members who have already migrated to survive. But the governments of the region also receive 
massive amount of funding from the United States, with the intent to spur economic growth. 
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States set aside 1.8 
billion dollars in appropriations in FY 2018. They gave over 401 million dollars in foreign aid to 
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Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador in the same year. Globally, the Northern Triangle 
obtained 3.1 billion dollars in foreign direct investment from FY2017-2019. Unfortunately, these 
multi-billion dollar attempts at investment to spur the stalling economies of the Northern 





2. Two-Factor Driven Migration 
  There is a small body of research that discusses drivers of migration in pairs. Unlike 
literature that discusses singular drivers of migration, this research offers a slightly more nuanced 
view of drivers. It offers a brief transition between migration driven by a single factor and 
multiple-factor migration, bringing us one step closer to the intricate explanations entanglement 
provides.  
  
Violence and Climate Change 
Several studies cite climate change as an exacerbating factor in driving violent conflict.67 
In “CLASH: Climate (Change) and Cultural Evolution of Intergroup Conflict” by van Lange et 
al., researchers found that climate is associated with violence in 82 percent of published studies 
and temperature is associated with violence in 83 percent of published studies.68 Their own 
research connects violence and climate change in several ways. They posit that warmer climates 
allow for a more short-term approach to life, with little future-oriented decision making. The 
consequences of violence are less severe because the warm climate makes other aspects of 
survival, like access to food, much easier. In contrast, those who live in colder climates have 
adapted to think long-term, potentially being able to mitigate violence in favor of cooperation for 
the sake of survival.69 However, as temperatures become dangerously hot, they become an 
additional stressor, threatening crop stability and making violence in warmer climates worse.  
  In “Climate Change and Levels of Violence in Socially Disadvantaged Neighborhood 
Groups,” Dennis Mares found that heat levels and levels of violence in disadvantaged 
 
67 Hsiang, Solomon M, and Burke, Marshall. "Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability: What Does the Evidence 
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neighborhoods in the US are correlated.70 The warmer it gets, the more people will be forced to 
interact with each other in less-than-comfortable conditions, and the higher chance of a violent 
conflict. In light of the estimated 2 to 4 degree Fahrenheit temperature change predicted if global 
warming continues on its current path, combined with the already occurring upward trend in 
temperature globally, this is especially concerning for mitigating the effects of climate change on 
violence.71 
 
Poverty and Violence 
Poverty is connected to increased exposure to violence. In “A New Social Contract for 
the Northern Triangle” Daniel Runde and Mark Schneider connect the economic disparity of 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to the high levels of violence in the region as a whole. 
Their proposal cites poor economic performance as the reason for the extremely high rates of 
homicide in the region in the aftermath of the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran civil wars. The use 
of extortion by street gangs and transnational organized crime groups against already poor 
people perpetuates issues of poverty, and continues to destabilize the region both economically 
and in terms of violence. This destabilization, created by this two-factor influence, continues to 
push migration in the region. 
  
Climate Change and Poverty 
Because of its precarious economic position and poor infrastructure, the Northern 
Triangle is severely affected by climatic shifts towards warmer weather. It cannot recover the 
way that wealthier areas or countries can. In “Poverty and Climate Change: Introduction,” 
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Stephane Hallegatte, Marianne Fay, and Edward Barbier research on the connections between 
climate change and poverty. In light of this body of research, the authors argue that, because of 
their lack of assets and income, the effect climate change has on poverty is not accurately 
represented in the GDPs of countries.72 Instead, they argue the focus should be put on other 
socioeconomic indicators to determine the impact climate has on poverty. Not only do they 
acknowledge the especially debilitating effect climate change has on poor people, they also 
examine literature making the connection as it flows in the opposite direction. Poverty leaves 
people vulnerable to climate change, but climate change also exacerbates poverty and keeps 
people in economically precarious positions. Climate and poverty are connected, and drive 
migration individually and by exacerbating each other. The literature that pairs climate change, 
poverty, and violence together offers a bridge into examining multi-factor driven migration. This 
approach not only constructs a direct connection between two drivers of migration, it also begins 
to acknowledge a multi-directional flow, or entanglement, of multiple factors.  
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Anna Tsing’s Model 
In The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins, 
Anna Tsing explores the world of the matsutake mushroom. In her exploration, she critiques the 
“summing up” of knowledge in order to make it more easily digestible. Instead, she argues for an 
emphasis to be put on the places where units of analysis complicate each other. She describes 
this method multiple ways: “unpredictable encounters,” “open-ended assemblages,” 
“collaboration,” “contaminated diversity,” “transformative relationships,” or entanglements. It is 
a method that emphasizes the ever-changing and, most importantly to this paper, relational 
nature of units of analysis, rather than isolating them in order to gather information.73 In 
migration, the “units of analysis” are the often separated, individual drivers of migration. 
Poverty, violence, and climate change are too often separated into singularly analyzed categories 
in order to better digest each driver, but this leaves out crucial parts of the story, as well as places 
where multiple drivers touch, unanalyzed. In contrast, Tsing’s method places an emphasis on 
these places of entanglement.74 
Tsing explores multiple examples of these entangled encounters. The ecology and 
economy of the matsutake mushroom relies on multiple overlapping parts, each stemming from 
sources that themselves overlap. The matsutake mushroom is almost exclusively found in 
human-disturbed environments, or places of “contaminated relationality,” where the 
relationships between organisms found “naturally” are affected by, and in turn affect, human 
interference. In Oregon, the matsutake did not arrive in the eastern cascades until decades after 
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industrialized timber extraction had destroyed acres of ponderosa pine. After this destruction, the 
government reestablished these forests with fir and lodgepole in a flawed attempt at 
environmental restoration. Matsutake exist in a symbiotic relationship with these trees, which 
exist in the eastern cascades because of the capitalist destruction of the environment for the sake 
of profit. This capitalist drive for resource extraction is one thread of the matsutake, paired with 
the capitalist exploitation of workers. Many pickers came after working “normal” jobs that 
barely allowed them to live. One picker describes his experience working at Walmart, where, 
after severely injuring his back with no access to regular paid time off, he was put on medical 
leave. He decided picking matsutake mushrooms was much more profitable than working at 
Walmart, where he received little pay and no benefits, and now picks full time.  
Still, others are veterans of war, unable to function well in “normal” society because of 
their experiences overseas. They pick because it allows them to make money while avoiding 
triggering their PTSD. War is another, albeit unexpected, thread in the entanglement of the 
matsutake. In addition to predominantly white Vietnam War veterans, many pickers are 
Southeast Asian refugees, or come from families who are in the United States because of conflict 
in Southeast Asia. War plays a large part in the reasoning of both American veterans and 
Southeast Asian refugees who pick matsutake. As discussed previously, veterans take advantage 
of the isolation to avoid triggering mental health issues set out from their combat experience. In 
contrast, their experiences with conflict became an advantage for many Southeast Asian pickers, 
who use their skills honed during years of guerrilla fighting to better navigate the forest, an 
advantage when picking elusive matsutake. Camps are also formed along the lines of divisions 
created during conflict. Southeast Asian pickers camp along lines established in Thai refugee 
camps. Groups of these Southeast Asians picking matsutake are incredibly ethnically and 
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culturally diverse, with camps full of Hmong, Mien, Lao, Cham, and Khmer peoples. Pickers’ 
experience with war contributes to what drew them to matsutake, and influences how they 
interact with the matsutake industry and the environment matsutake grow in. 
Yet another thread is the global economy in which matsutake exist. Matsutake is a truly 
global commodity; Tsing touches on picking season in the US, Japan, China, and Finland, but 
acknowledges there is still more to learn in Morocco, Korea, and Bhutan. The market for 
matsutake lies mostly in Japan, where it is viewed as a delicacy and is difficult to find. In 
discussing the matsutake market, Tsing takes into account the multiple economic perspectives of 
those working as matsutake pickers. For example, she discovers major differences in the ways 
the matsutake market is perceived depending on nationality, race, and linguistic ability. Many 
Americans, both white and Southeast Asian pickers, do not speak Japanese, and must rely on 
middlemen in order to sell their product. This language barrier leads many to often 
misunderstand the market. For example, one posting offering a high price for Japanese matsutake 
was misunderstood as an offer for any kind of matsutake. The lack of Japanese pickers in places 
where a large amount of matsutake grow, like the American northwest, means that people pick 
only knowing that their mushrooms are going to Japan without any context on the actual 
business. They know the mushrooms will be lucrative, but they technically do not have any 
access to their market without the necessary people to contextualize the market. 
This international market defies typical capitalist American desires, a connecting thread 
to the previously discussed capitalist desires that created matsutake in the United States in the 
first place. The urge to cut out the middleman and to have complete access to markets is 
impossible with matsutake. The pickers are only beholden to themselves, but while many pickers 
do desire to sell directly to Japan, most cannot because of the language barrier, their lack of 
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connections to the Japanese market, and a general cultural misunderstanding of matsutake’s 
value in Japan. Multiple cultural and linguistic interactions and misunderstandings characterize 
the matsutake economy, gathering multiple threads. 75 
 Around this thread of international markets lies another thread concerning race, 
including the rifts between white and Southeast Asian pickers and American perceptions of the 
Asian market for matsutake. White pickers avoid Southeast Asian pickers and tend to pick 
matsutake with different perceptions and goals. For example, while both groups of pickers cite 
“freedom” as part of the reason why they pick, white pickers participate in a much more 
“Americanized” version of freedom, specifically a more conservative one. White pickers almost 
never register to pick, trespass often, live predominantly in solitude, and emphasize the 
traditional masculinity found in living alone in the woods. To them, this is freedom. Southeast 
Asian pickers, in contrast, often register for licenses. They also trespass to pick, but they face 
significantly more risk of being fined for picking illegally, what many informants call “driving 
while Asian.” Southeast Asian pickers tend to stick together while camping, albeit with 
segregation of different ethnic groups. Their perceptions of freedom rely less on individuality 
and separation from the government and more so on the ability to freely move and practice 
culturally.  
The perceptions of American pickers also contribute to the thread of racial and ethnic 
perceptions creating the entangled story of matsutake. White pickers were convinced that 
matsutake were valuable because they were considered aphrodisiacs in Japan (which is false). 
There were some who were convinced the Chinese government drafted people into picking, 
when in reality Chinese pickers were just as independent as the American pickers. Perceptions of 
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other nations, which seem to be partly based on white American racial perceptions of Japanese 
and Chinese people, contribute to how the market functions. 
Domestic race relations, language barriers, and American perceptions of the world 
contribute significantly to the story of matsutake. They are often separately studied factors that, 
when looking at where they interact, form a larger picture of how they function separately and 
together. The reality of these different factors, rather than the sterile examination of each 
individual factor in a vacuum, creates the broader matsutake market. To quote Tsing: 
Ethnographers and journalists give us reports of survival, flourishing, and distress, 
here and there. Yet there is a rift between what experts tell us about economic 
growth, on the one hand, and stories about livelihood, on the other.76 
Matsutake mushroom exist in a bed of entangled threads— ethnic conflict, war, capitalist 
exploitation, informal economies, ecology, and cultural assimilation, to name a few. There are 
other threads she sees, including her surprise at finding Japanese-Americans in the camps and 
their unique history in the United States of forced assimilation during and after World War II. 
She discusses this contrast to the experiences of Southeast Asians, who, through sheer political 
chance, came in the 1980s and experienced assimilation in a completely different way, and in 
contrast to her own experiences as an Asian-American. Tsing constantly reveals more parts, and 
more entanglements, of the matsutake story. 
Tsing makes the point to show that one cannot understand matsutake mushrooms if you 
do not first understand the complex, interconnected world they grow in. In exploring the 
connections that make up the world of the matsutake mushroom, Anna Tsing collects evidence 
ranging from multiple disciplines and groups. She is explicit in her insistence that this evidence 
is a patchwork of interconnected ideas and occurrences, supporting her examination of survival 
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after capitalism through the complex story of the matsutake mushroom and the forests it grows 
in. In a similar way, understanding the interconnected nature of the numerous drivers of 
migration will help to illuminate more about why migration happens, guiding policy, public, and 
academic views in a direction that allows for more nuance in discussing a process that millions 
of people, many of them unwillingly, experience. This concept of entanglements is also useful in 
looking at the ways that climate change, as well as other well-studied factors driving migration in 
the Northern Triangle, interact in more complicated ways than the literature currently covers.  
 
Literature Examining Entanglement 
There is a small body of literature which examines multiple drivers of migration in 
relation to each other.77 However, the literature analyzing drivers of migration primarily analyzes 
them singularly or in conjunction with only one other driver of migration.  Unlike Tsing’s model, 
which emphasizes collaboration between units of analysis rather than isolation, the majority of 
literature discussing violence, climate, or poverty as drivers of migrations only considers the 
ways that they drive migration individually, without entanglement. Taking this into account, 
Muñoz-Morales et al. propose a causal loop model to conceptualize the ways that drivers of 
migration interact with each other, with indicators (marked in Figure 1 by double lines) to show 
a delay in the impact of a driver as interactions take place over time. It emphasizes “causal 
effects”, where the arrows point to the factor another reinforces. It visually represents the 
connections between violent conflict, food security, and environmental change, the three drivers 
of migration they discuss in their paper.  
 




Although this method of laying out the complicated ways that three drivers of migration 
intertwine is one step in the right direction, the causal loops model as a way to view drivers of 
migration in a more complicated and nuanced view is not complicated enough and suggests an 
unimportant commonality between different drivers of migration. For example, land use, which 
they categorize as falling under violent conflict, could, in the model of entanglement, be viewed 
as individual drivers that sometimes align and sometimes act in completely separate ways 
outside of violent conflict. Land use can be tied to violent conflict over land, but it can also be 
tied to economically-based adaptation strategies those in precarious socioeconomic conditions 
are forced to take. For example, in Harvey et al., it was found that 46 percent of farmers who 
acknowledged experiencing the effects of climate change adapted by changing the way they used 
Figure 1: The causal loops used to explain the connections between food insecurity, violence conflict, and environmental change as 
drivers of migration in Morales-Muñoz et al. Source: Morales-Muñoz, Héctor, Srijna Jha, Michelle Bonatti, Henryk Alff, Sabine 
Kurtenbach, and Stefan Sieber. “Exploring Connections—Environmental Change, Food Security and Violence as Drivers of 




their land, with many of them deciding to plant trees.78 In the same study, 32 percent of the same 
group of farmers who acknowledged climate change were experiencing food insecurity.79 While 
violence was not explicitly cited in this example, the changes in land use could have a negative 
effect on the amount of violence present in a region where environmental change and food 
insecurity are also issues. Those farmers who planted trees are actively fighting against the 
consequences of climate change and environmental degradation. This in turn could potentially 
have a negative effect on the presence of violence in the region and help to increase the viability 
of the land farmers are planting on. Their contributions to pushing back against the consequences 
of climate change could also benefit those experiencing food insecurity. By collectively planting 
trees, they could potentially improve a neighbor’s ability to grow food. In this way, land use 
moves beyond a factor of violence in driving migration. It becomes an active variable in the 
entangled structure of migration, becoming an aspect of both socioeconomic position and climate 
change. This is especially important when viewing these drivers of migration in the broader 
context of a complicated economic, political, and environmental situation, beyond the 
consequences of the three factors discussed in their research. The causal loop model proposed 
here does not allow for sufficient detail in exploring the ways that drivers of migration entangle. 
Entanglement allows for a more specific look into the correlations between drivers of 
migration (in a similar way that Tsing manages to connect biological functioning of a particular, 
man-made ecosystem with the consequences of race relations between Southeast Asian refugees 
and white people in Oregon). It allows us to look at how they influence each other and are 
influenced, how in some scenarios they may flow in a straight line and in others they double 
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back on each other. It’s important in order to discuss migration in a nuanced way without 
looking at broad categories and assuming they have a linear causality. 
 
Building Entanglements 
Simplifying the ways that migration is driven ignores that migration is a complex act, 
driven by multiple overlapping factors and often done when there are few or no other options. 
The issues of studying one factor of migration, and determining its overall importance to the 
phenomenon as a whole, are exemplified in “Environmental Influences on Human Migration in 
Rural Ecuador” by Clark Gray and Richard Bilsborrow. Their research focuses on how 
environmental change is affecting migration in rural Ecuador. Although this research is not 
specific to the Northern Triangle, it is an example of what hyper-focusing on one factor of 
migration can leave out. In their paper, they conclude that environmental influences are not 
affecting out migration from rural Ecuador, and that many rural Ecuadorians are able to cope 
with the effects of climate change.80 While their research is thorough, and their conclusion is not 
necessarily incorrect, it ignores all the other aspects surrounding climate change in rural 
Ecuador. Their paper explores to what extent climate specifically is affecting migration, but in 
controlling for just climate-related factors, they ignore how climate interacts with access to land, 
economic vulnerability, levels of violence, and other drivers of migration. In order to determine 
the extent to which climate is affecting migration from Ecuador, it is important to look at how 
climate interacts with other drivers in addition to how it directly affects migration. By leaving 
out the former analysis, a whole set of climate change-related drivers is left unanalyzed. 
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In research focusing on the Northern Triangle, articles studying one or, more rarely, two 
drivers of migration reveal a network of entangled drivers. For example, in “Market Shocks and 
Climate Variability: The Coffee Crisis in Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras,” Hallie Eakin, 
Catherine M. Tucker and Edwin Castellanos interview coffee growers in Mexico, Guatemala, 
and Honduras and record their responses to the consequences of global market shocks. Particular 
focus is put on the end of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989, which lowered the 
value of their coffee in combination with drought destroying their capacity to grow. The 
responses to the downturn in profitability of coffee grown by small-scale farmers has varied. The 
larger farms, which are in the minority, were able to keep up somewhat, while smaller farms, the 
vast majority, struggled. Some hoped for government regulations that would help their situation, 
although the ones that were enacted were largely ineffective because of the bureaucracy behind 
them, which required documentation of sale that most farmers did not have and did not correctly 
disseminate information about the programs. Many attempted to vary the crops they grew and 
diversify by changing the way they used their land. They switched from growing coffee, a crop 
that relies on shade provided by highland jungle and the natural terracing of the mountainside, to 
growing sugarcane, maize, or clearcutting for pastureland. They found that coffee growers 
associated this increase in deforestation with the droughts that were affecting their crops so 
detrimentally, and yet they seemed unable or unwilling to change the way they interacted with 
the land. According to the authors, this coffee crisis has also exacerbated the issue of emigration 
in the areas studied.81 Here lies the entanglement. 
 Climate change’s magnified effect on coffee growers in Honduras and Guatemala, due to 
their position in agriculture as well as their economic position, is partially not due to anything 
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they are doing specifically, like emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases, but it is instead 
being fueled by their deforestation. They recognize that deforestation is exacerbating the issue, 
but are left with little other economic choice except to attempt to diversity. Government 
programs are of no help to them, and they are largely completely reliant on the quality of their 
small plots of land and the predictability of the climate for their incomes. Economically, they are 
forced to make shifts to more lucrative crops like sugarcane or maize, which require more water 
and less forest cover than coffee, while also knowledgably exacerbating their own situation. 
Ultimately, many are choosing to migrate in response to this mixture of economic, climate, and, 
in part, political drivers. In this specific example, we can see the ways that drought, 
deforestation, land accessibility, lack of access to cash flows, and a non-functioning political 
system mesh to create an entangled driver of migration.  
As previously discussed, drought is connected to a warming climate as well as the effects 
deforestation has on the water cycle, and in turn results in the inability to grow food. For those 
with little access to money (or lack of access to cash flows), who rely on agriculture both for 
their income and also for their capacity to eat, changes must be made in order to survive. 
However, options for change are limited because of inability to access land, another consequence 
of systemic poverty. So, the combination of systemic poverty and climate change interact here to 
push farmers to clear cut forests or diversify their crops to more lucrative, but ultimately 
unsustainable, products. Drought is exacerbated by these decisions, but it also is what drives 
them. Their poverty, which is why drought puts so much pressure on them, is also driven by 
another set of violent, political and historical factors. They are poor in part because of a history 
of unequal land distribution in Honduras and Guatemala. In Guatemala, this issue drove a 
decades-long civil war, which propagated violence that further pushed these farmers into 
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economic insecurity that is still felt today.82 Although not discussed in the article, the history and 
current reality of violence in the region, which in turn is connected to disputes over land 
distribution that affect the capacity of farmers to survive today, meshes with the rest to 
exacerbate all drivers of migration, and in turn is exacerbated by all drivers of migration. The 
consequences of these violent conflicts, a continued status quo of little land redistribution and an 
ineffective government, are also a part of this entanglement. This connects to Tsing’s point that 
the places where perspectives diverge form the larger picture, that the complicated, overlapping 
nature of seemingly disconnected factors of race, ecology, and culture form the matsutake 
market. These seemingly disconnected factors are inextricable from each other, and work in 
various ways to exacerbate each individual driver. 
 These are not the only examples of the ways that different drivers of migration entangle 
to create a larger picture. To bring in a factor not discussed in the research on coffee growers in 
Honduras and Guatemala, violence in the Northern Triangle and the ways it interacts with other 
drivers of migration is another important aspect of entanglement. As previously discussed, Van 
Lange et al. found that climate is associated with violence in 82 percent of published studies and 
temperature is associated with violence in 83 percent of published studies.83 Economic 
conditions are also relevant to these existing entanglements, as they can make or break an 
individual’s ability to accommodate change in their place of origin or be forced to migrate. In the 
Northern Triangle, despite regulations, deforestation (specifically of the illegal nature) is a 
growing issue. Small subsistence farmers are often pointed to as the culprits, but other actors 
play a larger role in deforesting areas that, for decades, had been largely protected by indigenous 
rights groups and conservationists. Specifically, cartels and the violence and land degradation 
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they enact have become a growing issue in Central America since the early 2000s. Organized 
crime groups are a driving force behind illegal deforestation. It is incredibly profitable, and 
easier to traffic to lucrative northern markets than cocaine and other drugs. 
The US War on Drugs had a significant impact on the presence of cartels in the Northern 
Triangle. It pushed cartels out of the Caribbean and back into Central America, while at the same 
time providing Central American (and other Latin American) governments with arms, training, 
and economic incentives to violently stop drug trafficking.84 Central America, and particularly 
Honduras and Guatemala, became hubs for the transit of cocaine and the laundering of money, in 
part because of this shift in cocaine routes and in part because of the high levels of corruption 
present.85 These shifts ultimately were extremely lucrative for cartels, not only because they 
became centers for money laundering, but also because they expanded cartels’ sources of illicit 
income from cocaine trafficking into logging, cattle ranching, palm oil farming, and the selling 
of clear-cut land. In “Illegal Logging in the Tropics: A Synthesis of the Issues,” Ramsay Gavenel 
and Ilmi Granoff expand on this issue. Internationally, cattle ranching, palm oil farming, and 
simply selling clear-cut land is more lucrative than the subsistence farming already being done 
by local people.  
Kendra McSweeney et al. outline the issue of cartel invasion of eastern Honduras, and the 
violent consequences of this invasion. They found that, as cartels moved into the well-hidden 
wooded areas that are largely viewed as inaccessible or undesirable by the government and are 
primarily occupied by indigenous people, they began to enact a system of coercion backed by 
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economic inventive and violent threats.86 Cartels and the various people they hire to work for 
them have had a significant impact on the levels of violence in the Northern Triangle. In areas 
where cartels are rapidly coopting and deforesting land, threats are also made with more personal 
nuance in mind. Land grabbing is done through the nuanced integration of “middle-men” into 
local communities that previously were extremely protective of their land.87 These “middle-
men,” who marry into local families and typically run small businesses through which cartels 
launder their money, operate under a dual economic and violence-driven system in order to force 
peasants into selling their land while simultaneously getting them to convert it into a form that is 
more profitable. In addition to violence, they leverage debt, food prices, and knowledge of 
interpersonal conflicts.  
McSweeney et al.’s research reveals another factor contributing to entanglement in 
drivers of migration. Rural peasants are too poor and marginalized to fight back against their 
illicit invaders. This position of economic disparity puts them at the mercy of violence 
perpetuated by cartels. As cartels buy out more plots of land, the only way to create an income is 
to work for them. Peasants are employed to illegally clear land, work on cattle ranches and 
farms, and generally paid off to look in the other direction. Their participation, which is done out 
of economic necessity, further exacerbates their precarious economic position by worsening the 
environmental conditions around them and contributing to the widespread issue of drought 
through deforestation. Deforestation, an issue that is rising in significance in the Northern 
Triangle, is a significant contributor to more intense and frequent drought.88 Climate-change 
driven drought and deforestation are intrinsically connected, and, like factors driving migration, 
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feed into each other.  Reduction in forest cover in tropical climates increases the vulnerability of 
tropical forests to fire damage, caused both by drought and by purposefully set forest fires.89 This 
creates a cyclical issue: the higher the temperatures rise (due to climate change), the more 
vulnerable forests will be to forest fires, and both of these factors are exacerbated by a rapid 
forest-cover loss caused primarily by illegal logging.90  
Climate change goes hand in hand with ecological degradation. In Central American, 
prolific logging has contributed significantly to the issue of climate-change driven drought. 
Deforestation has contributed to several issues, including illegal logging from cartels and logging 
from peasants whose land is no longer viable. Peasants are forced to move because of infertile 
land or nearby threats. The factor of cartel violence and coercion McSweeney et al. explore 
becomes part of a larger entanglement of migration factors when looking at in the context of 
other literature exploring other singular drivers of migration. Ultimately, this increases the 
dispossession of people living in these rural places and exacerbates migratory pressures.91 In this 
way, those who will be most affected by climate change are also those being coerced into 
actively participating in their own climatic demise. This is in no way meant to blame 
communities forced, whether through violence, socioeconomic position (which will be expanded 
upon later) or a combination of both. Rather, it’s meant to draw connections previously not 
drawn in literature concerning the rise of cartel-related violence in the Northern Triangle, which 
in and of itself has been acknowledged in causing migration, and in the high levels of 
deforestation exacerbating the issues of drought. 
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An additional entanglement, wherein those who perpetuate violence are also victims of a 
system of increasingly strong economic pressures, is discussed in the 2019 article titled “The 
Violence Work of Transnational Gangs in Central America” by María José Menendez. 
According to José Menendez, cartels are not themselves the direct perpetrators of violence. 
Instead, they hire out former members of the military, ex-rebels, gang members, and, in some 
cases, local middle-men to carry out their “violence work.”92 José Menendez argues that, after 
over 30 years of civil war and prolonged peace processes in the Northern Triangle, the 
subsequent lack of socioeconomic integration of former militants, sustained high levels of 
violence, and generally poor national economies has created a sort of economy around paying 
people to commit violence. Gangs are also a part of this economy of violence, as their presence 
in the region has aligned closely with the period of political violence that created thousands of 
soldiers and ex-rebels who no longer fit in a post-civil war world. They too have suffered from a 
lack of economic integration, and, like their non-gang affiliated neighbors, live in positions of 
economic disparity that drove them to this work. In countries with a high cartel presence and few 
economic prospects, violence is a highly lucrative option, and those who are willing to 
participate in it can profit immensely.93 The violence that is committed, however, is 
predominantly violence committed by poor people against others in a similar socioeconomic 
position. Just as peasants are economically and physically forced to participate in the 
deforestation of their own land, so too are poor people in the Northern Triangle often forced to 
do violence work for the sake of making money. 
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4. Case Study: The Maya Biosphere Reserve 
On the border between Guatemala and Mexico, in an area that is rapidly becoming just as 
dangerous for migrants as the US-Mexico border, lies the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR).94 
Separated into four core regions of conservation, the MBR was created during the 10-year peace 
processes after the Guatemalan civil war.95 This area has long been a transit zone and a place 
where vulnerable communities attempt to escape colonial violence, civil war, economic issues, 
and environmental events.96 It is currently a place where (primarily indigenous) Guatemalan 
peasants consistently interact with both political and non-political perpetuators of violence, 
where unsustainable levels of deforestation occur, and where many migrants escaping north must 
cross through.97 
 In “Migration to the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala: Why Place Matters,” David 
Carr tracks the origins of the initial wave of migration to the MBR that occurred in the 1980s, 
1990s, and early 2000s. In his interviews, he discovers multiple explanations for why people 
migrated to the MBR, including being violently targeted as alleged rebels, moving to the MBR to 
join other rebels who had already fled, the destruction of croplands after mudslides in rural 
Guatemala, the consequences of Hurricane Mitch (which include the loss of property and the 
destruction of agriculture), insufficient access to capital, and the expense of land in other parts of 
rural Guatemala that had already been consolidated by cattle ranchers and plantations.98 These 
factors built on each other to form an exodus to the MBR from other rural parts of Guatemala. 
Carr uses three case studies to explore the reasons why people went to the MBR, but one is 
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particularly helpful in illustrating this point. People interviewed from the town of Nueva 
Concepción cited small land size, a growing population, flooding after Hurricane Mitch, a lack 
of government preparedness to avoid the flooding, and violence as reasons for migrating to the 
MBR. Many could not afford to buy more land to support their rapidly growing families, and 
after flooding from Hurricane Mitch destroyed the topsoil, those who were already in 
economically precarious positions could not afford to grow enough food. The violence of the 
civil war was also cited, in conjunction with these other factors, as driving people out.  
Expanding beyond Carr’s research, which singularly connects each of these “push” 
factors to another “pull” factor in the MBR, Guatemala City, or the US, we can see that the 
reserve is still characterized by these kinds of interweaving drivers of migration. As discussed 
previously, after the end of the Guatemalan Civil War, which encompasses the scope of Carr’s 
research, Guatemala was faced with a wave of violence stemming both from former combatants 
and new cartel pathways being forged into Central America. In the early 2000s, cartels began 
operating here as anti-drug policies in Guatemala shifted drug routes.99 This marks the beginning 
of actors of cartel-driven violence “replacing” violence driven by the Guatemalan Civil War and 
interacting with the environment in ways that significantly impact forest cover and drought in the 
MBR.  
In “Narco-Cattle Ranching in Political Forests” by Jennifer Devine et al., published in 
2020, the authors discuss the forests of the MBR in the context of overlapping factors of politics, 
violence, poverty, and a growing illicit cattle ranching industry. According to their research, the 
violence perpetuated against peasants in this region is done for one of two reasons – either 
peasants refuse to work as day-laborers for the cartels, or they refuse to sell their land to cartels. 
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Many peasants do not risk this violence, fully aware that the corrupt local and national 
government will do little to stop it, and instead become partners in the exacerbation of their own 
poverty. Those who do the labor of massive deforestation are also the ones that will suffer from 
the extreme drought that kills any sort of small-agricultural living they were previously able to 
derive from the forest. This is in no way an attempt to blame poor farmers for their own poverty, 
nor for the grotesque violence that is often perpetuated against them. Rather, the forced 
involvement of peasants living in the MBR is emblematic of an aspect of this entanglement. 
Threats of violence are effective against poor people with little power, and those people who are 
being forced into these environmentally precarious positions are also the ones who will suffer the 
most from the environmental backlash. 
In order to understanding what is driving movement to the MBR, and what is 
exacerbating drivers of migration in the MBR, Anna Tsing’s model of entanglement reveals 
more than the typical, singular analysis of drivers. By looking at the multiple drivers of 
migration, in this case by examining several studies in order to see a larger picture, unexpected 
connections between, for example, the poverty residents of the MBR experience, the accelerating 
deforestation in the region, and worsening droughts. The MBR is a specific area of Guatemala 
that is emblematic of a broader trend. As migration increases, and climate change continues to 
affect the way people live in both predictable and unpredictable ways, the model of entanglement 
will become even more important. It relies on the unexpected to create a picture, just as Tsing 
draws connections between Finnish environmentalists and Hmong migrants to the US, between 
the unique Japanese market for one, rare mushroom and the biology of forest regrowth. Tsing’s 
entanglements are essential to understand the context of the matsutake mushroom, and, in 
extending her argument, understanding her capitalist critique. Examining migration through the 
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lens of entanglement allows for a picture that encompasses more, and therefore can better 





In the field of migration, there is a broad range of multidisciplinary literature establishing 
various drivers of migration in the northern triangle. However, the literature discussing drivers of 
migration rarely discusses multiple drivers simultaneously. Anna Tsing’s methodology of 
entanglement offers a way to do this by focusing not on the individual drivers, but on the places 
where they touch and interact with each other. In connecting various, multidisciplinary sources, 
the bigger picture of migration from the Northern Triangle can better be seen. 
The limitations of my research are primarily based on data limitations. Climate change is 
difficult to predict, and at times the connection between extreme weather events and climate 
change are not clear. Additionally, although violence is a prolific issue in the Northern Triangle, 
the specific data on levels of violence is most likely underreported. This paper is also far from an 
exhaustive list of every way that drivers of migration connect to each other. Just as Tsing 
acknowledges in her argument that she must present a broad picture in order to reach some level 
of entanglement, so too must drivers of migration be approached from a broad lens in order to 
see where they contaminate each other. Additional research is necessary to determine where 
more drivers entangle, especially in light of the rapidly growing body of literature studying how 
climate change drives migration. 
The study of migration is already multidisciplinary. By focusing on the ways drivers of 
migration touch each other, and entangle together in significant and unexpected ways, we can 
better provide a cohesive analysis of migration and see the larger picture of migration more 
clearly. This paper also focused specifically on the Northern Triangle. Migration fueled by 
multiple drivers is also significant in other locations globally. Migration coming from conflict 
zones in Africa and the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, where rapidly rising seas threaten 
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islands, are just two examples of areas where this research can be extended to study how 
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